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[Crim. No. 11721. In Bank. Mar. 18, 1968.]

In re WILLIAM JOSEPH FINLEY on Habeas Corpus.
[1] Habeas Corpus - Grounds for ltelief - Adjudication of Habitual Criminality.-A habeas corpus petitioner was entitled to
attack a 1946 determination of habitual criminality on the
ground that a 1932 foreign burglary conviction was not an offense the minimum elements of which met the California definition of burglary or of any other crime listed in Pen. Code,
§ 644, defining habitual criminals, where the only available
record of the foreign conviction showed that the conviction
could have been based on acts not constituting burglary in
California and that the least adjudicated elements of the
foreign offense were not equivalent to the elements of the
similarly denominated California offense enumerated in Pen.
Code, § 644.
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PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from
custody. Writ denied; order to show cause discharged.
William Joseph Finley, in pro. per., and Charles Y. Boeggeman, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Petitioner.
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I

Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier,
Assistant Attorney General, Raymond M. Momboisse and
Edward A. Hinz, Jr., Deputy Attorneys General, for Respond,ent.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-In 1946 a jury found petitioner guilty
of first degree robbery. The information alleged and petitioner
admitted prior convictions of burglary in the State of Washington in 1932 and first degree robbery in California in 1938,
with service of a term of imprisonment for each. The Los
Angeles County Superior Court adjudged petitioner an habit[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Habeas Corpus, § 41 j Am.Jur., Habeas Corpus (1st ed § 59).
lI4cX. Dig. Reference: [1] Habeas Corpus, § 34(5) (j).
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ual criminal and sentenced him to life imprisonment. (Pen.
Code, § 644, subd. (a).)1 Petitioner did not appeal. 2
[1] In this habeas corpus proceeding petitioner attacks
the determination of habitual criminality. He contends that
the determination must fall beeause the 1932 Washington
burglary conviction was not of an offense the minimum elements of which meet the California definition of burglary or
of any other crime listed in section 644. Petitioner invokes
propositions enunciated over vigorous dissents in In ,.e
McVickers (1946) 29 Cal.2d. 264, [176 P.2d 40], and In re
Seeley (1946) 29 Cal.2d 294 [176 P.2d. 241. that permit the
habeas corpus petitioner who challenges an habitual criminal
adjudication a wider scope of review than is available when
the writ is sought to review a jUdgment of conviction of
crime. The McVickcrs majority concluded at page 270 that
"the writ can consistently be made available to a priSoner
who has been' adjudged an l1abitual criminal although in truth
and fact he is not, without so enlarging its scope as to make it
in effeet . . . a writ of error to review the correctness of a
convietion. "
Although Penal Code section 1025 pr.Jvides that a defendant's admission that he has suffered a previous conviction
charged in the accusatory pleading" must, unless withdrawn
by consent of the court, be conclusive of the fact of his having
suffered such previous conviction in all subsequent proceedings," under the McVickcrs-Sceley line of cases the admitted
IPenal Code section 644, subdivision (a), provided in 1946, as it now
provides, that "Every person convicted in this State of the crime of
robbery [or other naUled felollies] . • . who shall have been previously
twice convicted upon charges separately brought and tried, and who shall
have served separate terms therefor in any state prison ••• either in
this State or elsewhere, of the crime of robbery, burglary, [or other
named felonies] .•. shall be adjudged a [sic] habitual criminal and
shall he punished by imprisonment in tile state prison for life." In addi·
tion to an express life sentence an habitual criminal adjudication carries
witll it a 8ub..tantial increase in time that must be served before the
cJ<>fc)ulant becomes eligihile for parole. (Pen. Code, §§ 3047,3047.5,3048,
3048.5.)
Since 19:17 Penal Code section 6G8 has provided that one who has been
convicted in another state of an offense that, "if committed within this
State," could have been punished under the laws of this state by im·
prisonment in the st.atc prison" is punishable for any subsequent crime
committe-d within this State in the manner prescribed [in section 644]
. . . as if such prior cO)H"iction had taken place in a court of this State."
2Pet itioner 's codefendants appealed and the judgments against them
were affirmed in People v. Dunlop (1947) 79 Ca1.App.2d 207 r179 P.2d
658]. Later pet.itioner joined his codefendants in an unsuccessful coram
nohis proceeiling. (People v. Dllnlop (1951) 102 Ca1.App.2d 314, 316·317
[2:l7 P.2d 281].)
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"fact of his having suffered such previous conviction" is not
a conclusive admission that "such previous conyiction" was
in law or fact of a felony listed in section 644. The McVickcrsSeeley extension of habeas corpus permits the petitioner who
has been adjudged an habitual criminal to go outside the record of the California prosecution that resulted in the
determination of habitual criminality and to bring in the record of the challenged foreign prior conviction; he is nlIowed
to call the attention of the habeas corpus court to the law of
the state where it was suffered; and he is allowed thus to show
that the minimum adjudicated elements of the foreign crime
are not those of a California felony enumerated in section 644.
(In re Wolfson (1947) 30 Ca1.2d 20, 23,24 [180 P.2d 326] ;
In re McV1'cket's, supm, 29 Ca1.2d at p. 267; In re Seeley.
supra, 29 Ca1.2d at p. 300.) The McVickers-Seeley line of
cases holds also that unless the record before the habeas corpus court establishes the adjudicated elements of the previous
offense, the court will assume that the prior conviction was for
the least offense punishable under the foreign statute. (In re
McVickers, supra, 29 Ca1.2d at p. 278; see People v. Burns
(1960) 181 Cal.App.2d 480, 483 [5 Cal.Rptr. 301] ; People v.
Richardson (1946) 74 Cal.App.2d 528, 540 [169 P.2d H).)
Here the only record of the 1932 'Vashington conviction
now available, an authentieated copy of the judgment, sentence, and commitment, shows that petitioner was convicted of
second degree burglary on his plea of guilty. Second degree
burglary as defined by 'Vashington statute is committed by
entry with intent to commit any crime, whether misdemeanor
or felony, or by innocent entry followed by the commission of
any crime and breaking out. (Rem. Compo Stat., § 2579.)3 In
California, however, the crime of burglary is committed by
entry "with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any
felony . . . . " (Pen. Code, § 459.) Thus petitioner has established that his Washington convietion could have been based
on acts not constituting burglary in California and he has
therefore shown that "the least adjudicated elements of the
Washington offense are not equiva!ent to the elements of the
similarly denominated California offense enumerated in sec3Seetion 257!J: "Every person wllo, with intent to commit some crime
therein shall, under cireumst:lllces not amounting to burglary in the first
degree, enter the dwelling· house of another or brealt and enter, or, having
committed a crime therein, shall break out of, any building . . . wherein
any property is kept . . . shall be guilty of bmglary in the second
degree. . . • "
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tion 644 of the Penal Code and the Washington conviction is
not competent to support a determination of habitual criminality under that section." (In re Pearson (1947) 30 Ca1.2d
871,876 [186 P.2d 401].)
The Attorney General asks us to overrule the McVickersSeeley line of cases and to adopt the rule urged in the dissenting opinion in Seeley, 29 Ca1.2d at p. 303 (see also the dissent
in McVickers, 29 Ca1.2d at p. 281] that when an adjudication
of habitual criminality is attacked by habeas corpus on the
ground that the prior convictions were of crimes that do not
meet the definition of offenses listed in section 644, review
extends only to the trial court's jurisdiction to make such
determination and is limited to the face of the record in the
criminal proceeding that resulted in the determination. That
is the normal scope of inquiry on habeas corpus when as here
there is no issue of a fundamental constitutional deprivation.
(See generally In re Jackson (1964) 61 Ca1.2d 500, 503-504
[39 Cal.Rptr. 220, 393 P.2d 420]; In re Raner (1963) 59
Ca1.2d 635, 639 [30 Cal.Rptr. 814, 381 P.2d 638]; Neal v.
State of Oalifornia (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, 16-17 [9 Cal.Rptr.
607, 357 P.2d 839] ; In re McInturf!" (1951) 37 Cal.2d 876, 880
[236 P.2d 574] j In re BeU (1942) 19 Cal.2d 488, 492-494 [122
P.2d 22].) Whatever may have been the merits of the extension of the Scope of babeas eorpus as annoll.DC:Cld by JlcYieJurs
and Seeley in 1946,· however, their holdings have not led to
reckless and ill-considered use of the writ to impair the finality of judgments j the application of their roles as to the
extent of post-conviction collateral review has been limited to
"cases presenting the same narrow questions that were raised
by McVickers and Seeley themselves.
The Attorney General urges that the McVickers-Seeley line
of cases improperly permits relief without regard to established rules of policy (see In re Streeter (1967) 66 Cal.2d 47,
51-52 [56 Cal.Rptr. 824, 423 P.2d 976] j In re Shipp (1965) 62
Cal.2d 547, 553 [43 Cal.Rptr. 3, 399 P.2d 571]) that require
the applicant for habeas corpus to excuse his failure to present his contention at trial and on appeal and to explain his
delay in raising it on habeas corpus. The McVickers-Seeley
use of the writ, however, does not permit the opening or
4Those deciBions did not originate the use of the writ that we are considering here. They accepted and presented a rationale for an extension
of the writ that had already been made. (See eases cited in McVicker-II,
29 Cal.2d at p. 274, dissent at pp. 288-289, and 8eelell. 29 Cal.2d at p. 298,
di88ent at p. 306.)
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reopening of questions calling for resolution on the basis of
the testimony of witnesses who may have died or disappeared
or whose memories have faded. Nor does a collateral attack on
an habitual criminal adjudication on McVickcrs-Seeley
grounds involve difficulties with respect to records of past
convictions comparable to those raised by a constitutional
attack based on the retrospective application of Gideon v.
Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335 [9 L.Ed.2d 799, 83 S.Ct. 792,
93 A.L.R.2d 733]. (See In re Woods (1966) 64 Cal.2d 3, 8 [48
Cal.Rptr. 689, 409 P.2d 913].) The fact that an accused
suffered a foreign conviction of a crime is made officially of
record at the time and place of such conviction, and the law
of the jurisdiction where he suffered it is judicially noticed.
(In re McVickers, supra, 29 Cal.2d 264, 272, 276, 287; Pen.
Code, § 969b; Evid. Code, §§ 453, 1530.) The least adjudicated elements of the prior conviction remain the same
whether it is questioned in the trial court at the time of the
determination of habitual criminality or on habeas corpus
after such determination has become final. Neither the People
inor the defendant can go behind those adjudicated elements
lin an attempt to show that he committed a greater, lesser, or
different offense. (In re Norcutt (1948) 31 Cal.2d 743, 744
[192 P.2d 453J; In re Wolfson, supra, 30 Cal.2d 20, 31; In re
XcY~keTs, supra, 29 Cal.2d 264, 2;6_ J
The Attorney General argues, however, that if petitioner
had questioned the sufficiency of the 1932 Washington convic·
tion in 1946 when it was used as a basis of the habitual
criminal adjudication, the People might have been able to
prove by then existing but since vanished Washington records
that in fact petitioner's conviction was of an offense equivalent to California second degree burglary. Since the only
available record of the foreign conviction shows merely that it
was for a named Washington offense, McVickers does not
require the petitioner to bear the normal burden of one who
seeks habeas corpus relief by proving that the Washington
conviction was insufficient; instead he makes out its insufficiency simply by standing on the decisionally established
assumption that the conviction was for the least offense punishable under the Washington statute. When we examine the
applications that have been made of this anomalous rule giving the habeas corpus petitioner the benefit of a doubt in
order to sustain his attack on the final determination of
habitual criminality, we find only a narrowly limited change
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in the burden of proof on collateral attack upon a prior conviction used to increase punishment, not a general principle
requiring the People repeatedly to bear the burden of defending final judgments of conviction.
\Ye are not imprcsscd by the argument that the Seeley and
McVickers rules have operated unfairly to the state or conferred bonuses on prisoners for delay in attacking habitual
criminal adjudications. At least since the 1927 amendment of
Penal Code section 668, referring spccifically to section 644
(fn. 1, supra), prosecutors have had ample warning that they
should be prepared to support a foreign conviction charged as
the basis for the increased punishment attendant on habitual
criminality by proof that it was of an offense that, if committed in California, would be punishable by imprisonment in
the state prison. The 1927 aUH'Jl(lment of section 668, considered with sectiQn 644, advised prosecuting attorneys as well as
defendants that an offense denominated a "felony" in
another jurisdiction is not necessarily a crime that, if committed in California, would be punishable by imprisonment in
the state prison, and that the elements of an offense that
another jurisdiction calls by a name listed in section 644 are
not necessarily those of a similarly named California offense.
(See In rc McVicket·s, supra, 29 Ca1.2d 264, and dissent at p.
290.) Beginning in 1934 decisions on appeal tested the elements of prior foreign convictions underlying habitual
criminal adjudications in the manner later approved in the
McVickc1's-Seeley line of eases on habeas corpus, that is, by
reference to the records and judicially noticed law of the
jurisdiction where the prior cOllyiction was suffered. (People
v. Pace (1934) 2 Cal.App.2d 464, 466 [38 CatRptr. 202];
People v. Hayes (1934) 3 Ca1.App.2d 59, 63 [39 P.2d 213] ;
but see People v. Shaw (1934) 137 Cal.App. 533, 536-537 [30
P.2d 1031].) The McVic7.:ers-Sccley usc of habeas corpus was
anticipated by decisions of the Courts of Appeal (In re Connell (1945) 69 Cal.App.2d 360, 361 [156 P.2d 483]; In re
Howard (1945) 69 Cal.App.2d 164 [158 P.2d 408]; In re
1'hompson (1946) 72 Cal.App.2d 747 [165 P.2d 533) ; In re
Kingsbury (1946) 74 Cal.App.2d 959, 962 [170 P.2d 82)
and opinions of the Attorney General. (6 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gcn.
36 (1945); 3 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 198 (1944).) It should have
been apparent that' 'where prior convictions are alleged the
People should be prepared to prove them" (People v. Parra
(1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 93, 95 [13 Cal.Rptr. 828) and to
prove them beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Morton
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(1953) 41 Cal.2d 536, 539 [261 P.2d 523].) Nevertheless prosecutors alleged and defendants admitted prior convictions
that, although apparently sufficient to support an adjudication of habitual criminality, were in fact and in law not of
crimes that met the California definitions of the offenses listed
in section 644. Of course defendants were mistaken in permitting habitual criminal determinations based on such
insufficient prior convictions to stand without prompt challenge, but prosecutors were mistaken in persisting in their use
of foreign prior convictions that did not meet California
standards. II
Application of the McVickers-Seeley rules in reported cases
decided since their announcement dispels any notion that
recidivists deliberately delayed challenging habitual criminal determination in the hope that a belated attack might
give them some advantage. For several years after jJ[cVickers and Seeley were decided in December 1946 prisoners invoked them quite often, usually successfully6 but
occasionally to no avail,7 The proceeding now before us is the
:first reported case since In re Martin (1952) supra, 115 Cal.
App.2d 188, invoking the rules of McVickers and Seeley on a
collateral attack in the precise factual situation that those
rules were designed to correct. This decisional history does
not suggest that repetitive offenders have been taking unfair
liThe California Appellate Reports before McVickers and Seeley show
instances of foreign prior convictions underlying adjudications of
habitual criminality that were corrected on appeal or habeas corpus
because the foreign offense amounted to no more than larceny of $10
(People v. Pace (1934) Il'Upra, 2 Cal.Apl).2d 464, 466), larceny of some
amount in excess of $15 (People v. Hayes (1934) Il'Upra, 3 Cal.App.2d
59,63), driving an automobile with knowledge that it was stolen (People
v. Lohr (1938) 28 Cal.App.2d 397, 399 [82 P.2d 615]), breaking and
entering a building at night with no specific intent (People v. McChesney
(1940) 39 Cal.App.2d 36, 41 [102 P.2d 455]), driving an automobile
without the owner's permission (I'll re Connell (1945) supra, 68 Cal.
App.2d 360, 361, 365), theft of clothing of the value of $45 (I'll re
Howard (1945) Il'Upra, 69 Cal.App.2d 164), larceny of $35 (I'll re Thomp'
Bon (1946) Il'Upra, 72 Cal.App.2d 747), and obtaining $10 by false pre·
t.enses (I'll re Kingsbury (1946) supra, 74 Cal.App.2d 959, 962).
8In re Harincar (1946) 29 Ca1.2d 403, 406, fn. 2 [176 P.2d 58]; I'll re
Pear80n (1947) supra, 30 Ca1.2d 871, 876; I'll re Bramble (1947) 31
Cal.2d 43, 52 [187 P.2d 411]; I'll re Galloway (1947) 78 Cal.App.2d 880
[178 P.2d 469]; I'll re Lamey (1948) 85 Cal.App.2d 284, 288·289 [193
P.2d 66]; I'll re Mead (1949) 92 Cal.App.2d 536, 537 [206 P.2d 1091);
I'll re Page (1950) 99 Cal.App.2d 218 [221 P.2d 167]; I'll re Martin
(1952) 115 Cal.App.2d 188, 191 [251 P.2d 745J.
7In re Wolfson (1947) Il'Upra, 30 Cal.2d 20; I'll re Tedford (1948)
31 Ca1.2d 693, 695 [192 P.2d 3]; I'll re Norcutt (1948) supra, 31 Ca1.2d
743, 744; I'll re Schunke (1947) 81 Cal.App.2d 588, 590 [184 P.2d 700].

,

III,.
,

I

.

.

396

INRE FINLEY

[68C.2d

advantage of the State of California under McVickers and
8eeuy. The rules of those cases designed to permit review of
erroneous determinations of habitual criminality have not
been extended to factual situations other than those that they
were intended to correct, and we decline to overrule them.
Petitioner also attacks his 1938 and 1947 California convictions by averments directed to claimed denial of the right to
eounsel. The reeords of those California proceedings refute his
contentions that he was denied that right.
The 1946 adjudication of habitual criminality (Los Angeles
County Superior Court No. 105382) is set aside and the Adult
Authority is directed to disregard it. Petitioner, however, is
properly imprisoned under indeterminate sentences with maximum terlDS of life imprisonment. The order to show cause is
discharged and the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is
denied.
Peters, J.; Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., Sullivan, J.,
and Peek, J.,. concurred.
:

eRt)tired A880ciate Justice of the Supreme
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